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Abstract: This special feature presents several papers generated under the EU-
funded ‘Cross Sectoral Commons Governance in Southern Africa’ (CROSCOG) 
project. The feature builds on knowledge generated in case studies which explored 
existing integrated resource knowledge and governance practices of rural people 
living in Southern African commons. In earlier generations, especially during the 
pre-colonial periods, most Southern African societies developed quite effective 
indigenous institutions for the management of entire landscapes and their 
component ecosystems, when this was in their interest. Few of these integrated 
Southern African systems are effective today as they have gone through massive 
changes, for example due to colonial influences, the increased role of the market 
and/or conflicts over use and access to natural resources. Meanwhile, most 
efforts to rebuild or affirm (the management of) the commons through various 
initiatives, have been specific to certain resources or localised areas. Conversely, 
the smaller number of ecosystem-wide land use planning initiatives that sought 
to enhance overall environmental health have been dominated by technical, anti-
political approaches that failed to understood the differential roles of resources 
in the spectrum of local livelihoods, and failed to achieve the required broader 
reinforcement of local governance. This introduction and the papers it introduces 
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explore opportunities and challenges with respect to integrating scale – landscapes, 
ecosystems, and governing systems – into the local commons.
Keywords: CPRs, cross sectoral commons governance, scaling up, Southern 
Africa, sustainable livelihoods
1. Introduction
Since the early nineties the mainstream study of the commons has been fairly 
consistent in its focus and concept definition. Most scholars in this academic field 
agree with the definition by Swallow and Bromley (1995: 100), who consider a 
common property regime “to be a set of institutional arrangements that define 
the conditions of access to and control over a range of benefits arising from 
collectively used natural resources”. Jodha (1995a: 3279) defines common 
property regimes (CPRs) as “institutional arrangements evolved by communities 
to collectively manage and use their natural resources”. Subscribing to a similar 
definition McKean and Ostrom (1995: 5) define common property or common 
property regime as “property rights arrangement in which a group of resource 
users share rights and duties towards a resource”. Central to this definition is 
communal ownership and management where no member has exclusive rights 
over the resource. This is what (usually) distinguishes common property from 
other types of property.
Throughout the world the commons have been observed to be declining in 
size and in productivity (Jodha 1992, 1995a,b; Leach and Mearns 1996). The 
circumstances which historically favoured CPRs have been replaced by those that 
disfavour them, in particular due to trends of privatisation and commodification 
under conditions of neoliberalism (McCarthy 2005). In many Sub-Saharan African 
countries it was believed (especially by colonial powers) that CPRs which were 
based on traditional leadership were flawed systems which caused natural resources 
degradation. This became received wisdom (Leach and Mearns 1996) and was 
combined with the ‘tragedy of the commons’ thesis to legitimise state intervention in 
management of the commons (see Hardin 1968). The hallmark of this intervention 
was a zeal for reform entailing mainly privatisation and nationalisation of communal 
resources (see e.g., Swift 1991; Runge 1992; Quiggin 1993; Steins and Edwards 
1999; Magole 2003, 2009). While communal land tenure and other traditional 
natural resources management arrangements were condemned as being inherently 
destructive to the resource, state and or individual (or small groups in some cases), 
privatised natural resource control was favoured and believed to be able to provide 
better custodianship for the resources. To this end, policies, regulations and attendant 
institutions were developed and enacted. Enclosures of many kinds were set up, 
ranging from ranches, protected areas and game reserves, limiting access to land 
and resources for many peasants and rural people.
Against this background, scholarship critical of the tragedy of the commons 
thesis and its real-world effects has burgeoned. Indeed, as Michael Goldman 
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has argued, the ‘epistemic world of the commons scholars’ has not only tried to 
‘reinvent’ the commons, but also practically ‘defend’ it against a host of destructive 
influences and unjust assumptions (Goldman 1997). This, he shows, has led to 
three ‘tendencies’ in the ‘anti-tragedy’ school, which he identifies as the ‘human 
ecologists’, the ‘development experts’ and the ‘global resource managers’:
“the human ecologists (…) demonstrate the complexity of the commons from 
a local culture- and territory-based perspective; the development experts 
programmatically show how to restore the degraded commons, strengthen 
weakened social institutions, and ‘modernize’ the Third World poor; and the 
global managers explain how the commons are not just local or the problem of 
the poor, but contribute to global ecological crisis” (Goldman 1997: 4).
Interestingly, he adds that “although their collective self-image is one in opposition 
to the facile tragedy model, in fact, their assumptions and instrument-effects are quire 
similar” (Goldman1997: 4). A decade later, this sentiment is echoed by Mansfield 
(2007: 68), who argues that commons scholars see in the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
really a ‘tragedy of open access’. She argues that much of the commons scholarship 
endorses the same general logic that constitutes the tragedy of the commons thesis 
in that they all “link forms of property, economic rationality, and environmental 
outcomes”. The question usually becomes ‘how to get the institutions right’ so that 
common property systems ‘start functioning properly’ and generate the desired 
social and environmental outcomes (see also Agrawal 2002).
Obviously, many scholars go beyond such a simplistic view of the commons. 
Yet, the dangers of retaining the underlying assumptions that also characterise the 
tragedy of the commons remain. In fact, in trying to marry insights into issues 
around knowledge, political economy and power in relation to the commons with 
a hope at ‘promoting effective governance of the Southern African commons at 
scale’, the current paper and the contributions to the special feature it introduces 
are not always able to avoid these either. It does, however, provide an important 
snapshot of where current commons research in Southern Africa stands. Place-
specific and rich in empirical detail, the contributions to the current special feature 
of the International Journal of the Commons hope at the very least to contribute 
to McCarthy’s (2005: 24) call to be specific about why in many cases “a common 
property regime is expected to lead to better social and environmental outcomes 
than state or private ownership”. Hence, while we admit that commons systems 
and scholarship have their own problems, the current authors and the contributors 
all share the same practical and political agenda of the need for affirming the 
commons (Turner 2004). Affirming the commons is not the same as trying to 
optimalise CPR institutions through interventions. Rather, it is to first and foremost 
acknowledge that CPRs continue to exist in the face of adverse circumstances 
and are in many cases the only feasible option and lesson for sustainable natural 
resources management. This is what the contributions to the special feature have 
in common and what the current paper hopes to spell out and introduce in more 
detail in the Southern African context.
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2. The commons in Southern Africa
Research has shown that in earlier generations, some Southern African societies 
developed relatively effective indigenous institutions for the management of entire 
landscapes and their component ecosystems, when this was in their economic 
(and sometimes political) interest. The Lozi of the Zambezi floodplain in western 
Zambia are a well-known example of this indigenous integration of livelihoods 
and natural resource management in a local governance system (Munalula 2000). 
Papers in a recent special issue of Development Southern Africa (2009, volume 
26, number 4) upon which this special feature builds, also outline some of the 
virtues of pre-colonial resource management systems. They also point out that 
few of these inherently integrated resource management systems of Southern 
African remain operational today.
The common conclusion is that indigenous commons governance has 
been inherently weakened in terms of the adherence to rules and regulations, 
protection of natural resources, conflict resolution and protection of access 
rights and livelihoods. In many of the cases it was found that a colonial legacy 
which was later inherited by post-colonial governments set up a governance 
system which ignored indigenous knowledge and commons practice (Haller and 
Chabwela 2009; Magole 2009a,b; Mhlanga 2009). In some cases it was found 
that indigenous management regimes were replaced by sectoral or fragmented 
systems that focused on technical, ‘anti-political’ rationales (Büscher 2010). In 
yet others it was found that unequal power relations were less and less counter 
balanced by traditional CPR rules and institutions, making it ever more difficult 
for so-called ‘stakeholders’ to negotiate their ‘stake’. Overall, however, and in 
line with Brockington et al.’s (2008) argument related to protected areas, new 
institutional arrangements for natural resources management were found to be 
empowering to some and disempowering to others; hence distributing fortunes 
and misfortunes unevenly.
In the Southern African commons therefore, resource management is now 
almost always formally in the hands of the respective governments, whose 
resource management agencies operate in various degrees of cooperation with 
local communities, and/or traditional decision making authorities. Extensive 
research has found that this degree of cooperation is itself a critical determinant 
when it comes to the functioning of commons management (Blaikie and 
Brookfield 1987; Bromely 1992; Jodha 1992; Ostrom 1992; Mckean and Ostrom 
1995). Recent research in fisheries management, for example, has found that 
a community perception that the government efforts are responsive to their 
concerns are critical for general support for biodiversity conservation, while the 
participation of the traditional authorities is the key to the effective enforcement 
of management rules (Wilson et al. 2006). However, this necessary element is not 
sufficient. Exacerbated by extreme poverty and low literacy levels, in many cases 
biodiversity conservation efforts involving local communities in Community 
Based Natural Resource Management (CNNRM) arrangements have not been 
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successful, leading some to argue for a return to ‘fortress conservation’ that seeks 
to exclude local people from resources in order to ensure their conservation (see 
Hutton et al. 2005; Büscher and Dressler 2007). This is not, however, a strategy 
that can be successful over larger ecosystem scales. As Turner (2004) argues in 
reference to terrestrial ecosystems, the problem has often been that conservation 
efforts take the form of focused projects when the real problem is how to strengthen 
existing or potential resources management practices across wide areas in order to 
achieve more sustainable rural development.
3. Scholarship, policy and practice in sustainable rural 
development
Applied social science has made many contributions to strategy and policy for 
‘sustainable rural development’, but scholarship has been particularly prominent 
in debates and action for governance of the commons in Southern Africa. Here, 
academics and researchers have been central to much of the debate and strategic 
development, with particular emphasis on the emerging concepts of community-
based natural resource management and sustainable use. At the heart of these 
efforts have been the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at the University 
of Zimbabwe and its first director, Marshall Murphree, who inspired not only 
Zimbabwean scholars of the commons but many others across the region. CASS 
served as a model for the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) 
at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa, and from 1999 to 2006 
these two institutions ran a joint programme of applied research on CBNRM. 
Murphree’s career has been marked by the ability to span academic and policy 
work. Chair of the board of Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife from 1991 to 1995, he 
was central to the development of that country’s Communal Areas Management 
Programme for Integrated Resources (CAMPFIRE – see Murphree 1997). Like 
him, scholars at CASS, PLAAS and many other academic centres across the 
region have actively engaged in efforts to encourage the residents of communal 
areas to participate in the management and protection of natural resources for 
livelihood gain.
These efforts to apply social science in combating poverty and loss of 
biodiversity in Southern Africa focused initially on CBNRM and related themes 
such as co-management, ‘people and parks’ and ecotourism, and generated a 
substantial literature while underpinning much of the strategic development of 
programmes like CAMPFIRE, Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE, Namibia), 
Administrative Management Design (ADMADE, Zambia) and Training and 
Support for Natural Resource Management (TRANSFORM, South Africa) 
(see, e.g., Hulme and Murphree 2001; Fabricius et al. 2004; Dressler et al. 
2010). Possibly the closest integration of academic and applied effort has been 
manifested in the work of the Southern Africa Sustainable Use Specialist Group 
(SASUSG) of the World Conservation Union’s Species Survival Commission. 
Through years of often contentious debate and programmatic experimentation, 
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this group has promoted the still controversial notion that “landholders should be 
the primary beneficiaries of biodiversity conservation, and that conservation is an 
important component of, and contributor to, livelihood and economic strategies” 
(SASUSG 2009). CBNRM spans all landscapes of communal tenure (and can 
also be applicable to group-owned areas under private tenure). Sustainable use 
work has focused more on protected areas. But there are close conceptual and 
working relations between the two fields of effort.
Since the 2000 conference of the International Association for the Study of 
the Commons (IASC) in Bloomington, there has been increasing recognition 
of the overlaps between the concepts of CBNRM and of the governance of the 
commons in developing countries. The two fields of scholarship have effectively 
merged, and CBNRM research from Southern Africa and elsewhere has been 
amply represented at subsequent IASC conferences. This special feature of the 
International Journal of the Commons represents that merger, offering some 
of the outcomes of a two-year work programme by scholars of the Southern 
African commons that were initially presented at the 2008 biennial conference 
of the IASC in Cheltenham and at its 2009 African regional conference in Cape 
Town.
Looking back over the heritage of our scholarship – from the involvement of 
Murphree and others in programmes like CAMPFIRE and LIFE to more recent 
work with initiatives like the Okavango Delta Management Plan – we should 
pause to ask ourselves what these efforts at applied social science are really worth. 
What can scholarship actually contribute?
At the most basic level, it is obvious that – as in countless other fields of 
endeavour – scholarship of the governance of the Southern African commons 
makes a major contribution by enhancing our understanding of the process. It 
records, describes and explains how it is practised, where it is considered ‘effective’, 
where it is not and by whom and why. It assesses the roles and resources of the 
various participants in the process and analyses the power relationships that are 
key to any kind of governance.
It is generally assumed that this better understanding is converted into better 
policy for commons governance – that is to say, policy that makes more realistic 
assumptions about the various actors’ motivations, roles and resources, that makes 
the best use of existing or potential new institutions’ usually limited capacity, and 
that is dedicated to outcomes congruent with most commons scholars’ values: 
equity, sustainable resource use, the conservation of biodiversity and the allevia-
tion of poverty. Obviously, in reality this is often not the case, as ethnographic 
work on development and environment policy by David Mosse has shown (Mosse 
2005). He argues that often,
“policy goals come into contradiction with other institutional or ‘system goals’ 
such that policy models are poor guides to understanding the practices, events 
and effects of development actors, which are shaped by the relationships and 
interests and cultures of specific organizational settings” (Mosse 2004: 663).
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Nonetheless, ‘policy’ is a comfortable point at which many applied social scientists’ 
personal value chains seem to stop. ‘Better’ policy for the governance of the 
commons must surely be a decent outcome for scholarship. But more fundamentally, 
we need to consider how much of a difference policy actually makes in the current 
political and institutional frameworks of Southern African states. Whether it is 
a national constitution or an agreed approach to the management of wetlands, 
policy has only theoretical value if it remains disconnected from the political and 
institutional processes that precede and come after it. What the papers generated 
by the CROSCOG team repeatedly show – and could be demonstrated in countless 
other cases from across the Southern African commons – is that the interlocking 
political, economic and institutional problems in the region today prevent many 
policies from being understood and implemented in the manner that was intended – 
or being implemented at all (see also Mosse 2004; Magole 2008). The ‘gap’ between 
policy and practice is often wide and getting wider (Büscher and Dressler 2007).
Policy is not solely the mandate of the state and its agencies. One of the 
contributions of scholarship of the commons is to emphasise the roles of other 
actors and institutions. Research can contribute to enhanced policy for local 
government bodies, traditional leaders and community structures too. But the 
same critical question remains essential – is it easier said than done? How realistic 
is our analysis in finding ways to make better policy result in better practice – 
more effective governance of the commons that responds to the kinds of values 
identified above?
One answer to this challenge – adopted by some of the authors in this 
special feature – is to move beyond the conventional research stance into a more 
participatory engagement with the commons governance processes they seek to 
understand and enhance. It may not be helpful to describe such engagement as 
‘action research’ – an elastic and sometimes vacuous concept – but what we see 
from efforts like those of Chabwela and Haller to support the development of 
resource management by-laws in a Zambian wetland is reminiscent of earlier 
decades of academic engagement in programmes like CAMPFIRE and LIFE. 
It is beyond the scope of this introduction to discuss the operational implications 
of this kind of scholarly engagement with the governance of the commons; 
but readers are invited to consider these questions as they review some of the 
outcomes of the last two years’ work on cross-sectoral commons governance in 
Southern Africa.
4. Cross sectoral commons governance
The Cross Sectoral Commons Governance in Southern Africa (CROSCOG) project 
aimed to share existing research and experiences in the governance of large scale 
natural resource commons across different ecosystem types – including marine 
and other large water body coastal zones, arid and semi-arid grasslands, savannas 
and woody patches, and floodplain ecosystems in Southern Africa. The project 
was organised in two themes. Theme one explored case studies, while theme two, 
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which is the subject of this special feature, goes further to explore how countries 
can build on the existing integrated resource knowledge and governance practice 
of rural people to achieve more effective governance across natural resources 
sectors (coastal, floodplain, grass, savanna and forest patches) and scales (small 
to large). The following discusses the two themes in some more depth.
4.1. Theme one: knowledge, political economy and power: understanding 
the governance of the commons in Southern Africa
This theme set the framework for the development of comparable commons 
management case studies across resource sectors in Southern Africa. It also set 
out to facilitate a process of sharing experiences and lessons in ways that can 
usefully inform development and conservation policy and programmes. Under the 
theme, case studies were required to assess the roles played by knowledge, power 
and political economy in the governance of the commons in Southern Africa with 
particular reference to the three ecosystem sectors of coastal zones, forest and 
grasslands patches and floodplains.
With regard to knowledge, cases sought to answer the following questions: 
What is the condition of indigenous environmental knowledge and management 
skill? Is it robust, or dying out with the older generation? How is it distributed 
across age, gender and economic groups in rural society, and what social, 
cultural, spiritual or political factors influence its use or sharing by and among 
these groups? How are indigenous technical knowledge, management skills and 
approaches perceived by external agencies including and especially by the state? 
The main question being considered by the case studies with regard to political 
economy was; to what extent and why are there private rights to ‘commons’ 
resources – who holds them, and what are the economic consequences for the rest 
of local and national society? To come to a common understanding of power in 
the governance of the commons in Southern Africa cases attempted to answer the 
following questions: What is the state of society across the nation within which 
a specific Southern African commons is located? Is it dominated by centrifugal 
tendencies, by ethnic difference, by rapid demographic change, by the collapse 
of indigenous culture and institutions, by rapid commodification, by political 
strife, by elite exploitation or by various combinations of the above? Who are the 
winners and losers across national society in the politics of commons rights, use 
and management?
While a comprehensive presentation of theme one cases of the project is not 
within the scope of this introductory paper, it is necessary to provide a very brief 
overview of the cases per each of the fore mentioned commons resource sectors 
which as stated above lay the foundation for work under theme two. Three flood 
plain cases were studied under theme one. These were the Lake Chilwa floodplain 
fisheries case in Malawi; the Kafue Flats and their surrounding areas in Zambia 
where mixed resource use is practiced; and the Okavango Delta flood plains case 
where CBNRM is commonly practiced. The main lesson from the flood plain cases 
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is that common-pool resources are increasingly managed by agencies located far 
from the floodplains. These agencies possess neither the necessary knowledge nor 
experience that the local communities possess. In the process local indigenous 
knowledge is lost.
Four grasslands and woody patches cases were studied. These were the 
commons on the southern shores of Lake Kariba in Zimbabwe where historically 
mixed use of the commons existed; the Eastern Okavango forest patches where 
until independence the indigenous San communities practiced their hunting and 
gathering livelihood strategies; the Lake Ngami (South West of the Okavango 
Delta region) where the Ovanbendero community have for years practiced 
their traditional pastoral system; and the Dwesa-Cwebe area of the South African 
Eastern Cape coast where local people have been banned from using forest 
resources for many years. The main lesson emerging from the grasslands and 
woody patches studies is that people are marginalised by broader economic 
interests and broader definitions of sound environmental management and also 
along ethnic lines.
Lastly, three coastal zones cases dealing particularly with fisheries were studied. 
These included the Kapenta fishery on Lake Kariba and the case of the dynamics of 
policy evolution in Southern African fisheries featuring studies in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. In these two cases economic and power plays were most prominent. 
Lastly the case of Lake Chilwa in Malawi shows how traditional institutional 
arrangements for governance were steadily disrupted by government regulation.
4.2. Theme two: promoting effective governance of the Southern African 
commons at scale
Having established a broader, consolidated understanding of the Southern African 
commons through the first stage of its work (theme one), CROSCOG moved in 
to its second stage, to a fundamental challenge for scholars, policy makers and 
practitioners in the region: How can effective governance of land and natural 
resources be built back up to scale across the communal areas of Southern Africa? 
Enormous resources and huge effort have been poured into ‘focused’ or project-
based CBNRM in various localised areas over recent decades, but the majority of 
the region’s communal area landscapes and societies have not directly benefited 
from this effort.
Across most of the communal areas of the region, as CROSCOG studies have 
demonstrated, the state and its policies and laws are more absent than present, 
despite pretence to the contrary. Many common property regimes are drifting 
into open access. Others are being steadily privatised, typically by extra-legal 
means that benefit a richer minority and further impoverish the poorer majority – 
leading to accelerated resource degradation on remaining communal lands. 
The most widespread systems for governing the commons today are those 
elements of indigenous frameworks that have persisted despite the oppression 
or neglect of the colonial and post-independence eras. Guided by the principles 
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of those indigenous frameworks, some communities and their traditional 
leaders continue to achieve a degree of coordinated governance of their 
natural landscapes – with scant support from the outside world of policies and 
projects.
The fundamental question, then, is whether it is worth working to sustain the 
commons as a mode of resource tenure and governance for Southern Africa. The 
answer must be yes. This is not because the commons are inherently morally, 
ideologically or economically superior to other types of ownership. Rather, we 
and the other CROSCOG partners believe that practically the commons work out 
to be more morally, economically and ecologically feasible and, in the strained 
economic circumstances currently afflicting the region, they are also the most 
cost-effective means of sustaining livelihoods and natural resources. Moreover 
and importantly, it is because they provide alternative ways of imagining relations 
between humans and nature within a wider political-economic framework that 
often aims to reduce these relations to narrow commercial or technocratic ones. 
Hence, common property regimes do and will continue to have a vital role to play. 
Instead of allowing the commons to fragment and decay, Southern Africans must 
revive, reinforce and affirm them.
The CROSCOG programme therefore identified dual policy and research 
challenges:
The dual policy challenge on the Southern African commons now is to achieve 
a practical understanding of the livelihood roles of the various resources 
in these ecosystems, and to build enhanced and integrated governance of 
these resources into reinforced and legitimate local government systems 
at scale across the region. This challenge cannot be effectively tackled 
through conventional project approaches, which are typically limited to 
environmental sub-sectors or localised areas. Instead, policy must build on 
the indigenous foundations of integrated environmental management that 
many rural societies still struggle, imperfectly, to practise. It must focus 
not only on the specialised challenges of natural resource management, but 
on the general challenges of building effective local government in rapidly 
changing rural societies. The dual research challenge is to support these 
policy imperatives. We need to generate more evidence about the differentials, 
integration and trends in livelihood dependence on ecosystems and their 
effective management. At the same time, research needs to explore effective 
ways to build enhanced natural resource management into enhanced local 
government in and by rural communities.
Institute for Fisheries Management et al. 2006: 32.
Following the comparative, synthetic reviews of its first phase, the second phase 
of CROSCOG’s work tried to address these challenges more directly. The team 
of researchers sought evidence and inspiration from each other’s work in various 
terrestrial, aquatic and wetland ecosystems across selected Southern African 
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countries, in the hope of being able to identify lessons that could be more broadly 
applied in reinforcing the governance of the commons at scale – breaking out of 
the project mould and striving for sustainable livelihoods and resource use across 
whole landscapes. Some of the outcomes of this effort are presented in the papers 
that follow. Although the programme aimed to find elements of success that could 
and should be replicated, it is hardly surprising that the cases we report have little 
to recommend it. Even those cases, however, offer lessons about what the better 
ways forward may be.
5. The contributions to the special feature
Focusing on Zambia, Chabwela and Haller recount the complex resource 
management history of the Kafue Flats wetlands. Here, resource abundance 
and reportedly effective governance of common pool resources by indigenous 
institutions have been replaced by conflict and competition between local and 
immigrant resource users and between indigenous and state institutions. Fisheries 
and other resources are degraded and overused. Various project interventions 
and exogenous institutional initiatives have proved unsustainable. Since 2004, 
in an important example of the committed, engaged research discussed above, 
researchers have helped to facilitate new and more inclusive debate about more 
effective resource management, leading to consensus about fisheries by-laws that 
would be passed by District Councils. This is an attempt to replace the present-
but-absent role of central government with what is hoped will be a more effective 
role for local government.
In their analysis of fisheries co-management institutions in Southern Africa 
(focusing on Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia) Wilson et al. came up with three 
conclusions. The first is a general confirmation of what has long been an insight 
from qualitative research that a more responsive management institution is also 
seen as a more effective one. The second is that co-management institutions that 
are made up mainly of fishers are seen as more effective than ones that try to 
incorporate a broad range of other stakeholders. The third is that seeing local 
conservation efforts as generally effective and making a positive contribution 
to village life is not related to seeing co-management institutions operating as 
rule enforcement mechanisms. Management implications here are that in light of 
failed state interventions resource users are best placed to manage the resources 
and their interaction with them.
Nyikahadzoi et al.’s work on the political economy of transformation 
and governance reform in industrial fisheries focuses on the experiences of 
transformation and reform of governance in the pelagic fisheries of South Africa 
and Zimbabwe. The two countries have had similar experiences as they undergo 
post-apartheid political and socio-economic transformation. Like in other areas 
of the political economy of these countries the pertinent special feature to address 
within pelagic fisheries was the racially motivated inequalities in access to the 
fisheries. The study demonstrates that reliance on market mechanisms as the 
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main driving force for change in both countries has merely reinforced the skewed 
ownership patterns and power relations, with a limited number of strategically 
positioned black elites benefiting. Neither the state nor the market place has been 
able to secure equitable distribution and the creation of an inclusive governance 
system. This paper like others in this volume concludes that the solution could 
be found in innovative approaches to transformation and governance that 
genuinely include the players without undermining the economic viability of 
the industry, rather than the use of conventional top-down state and free market 
interventions.
Scaling up is hardly a new concern in rural development debate. Southern 
African governments and their international partners are well aware that local 
success stories make only a limited contribution to the general enhancement of 
livelihoods and natural resources. They are constantly concerned to achieve the 
sustainability of their interventions, even at the local scale, and their replication. 
All too often, neither goal is attained. Without getting into a detailed discussion 
here about the vertical and horizontal dimensions of scaling up technical and 
institutional innovations, this introduction to the second phase of CROSCOG’s 
output can at least identify some typical scenarios, all of which our researchers 
have encountered in their own search for ways to move out from the local to the 
broader landscape.
Broadly speaking, the experience of the Southern African commons suggests 
three (sometimes overlapping) scenarios in which the prospects for scaling up or 
replicating successful governance arrangements can be assessed. In some cases, 
as the designers of CROSCOG hoped, there really are promising elements of 
success whose broader application seems feasible. The idea of working through 
local government bylaws is not new, but is being rediscovered by the present 
generation of rural people, analysts and planners in the Kafue Flats case that 
Chabwela and Haller describe in their paper. Though not discovered through a 
CROSCOG case study there are similar initiatives to enhance governance of the 
Lesotho commons through Community Council bylaws (Turner 2006). As noted 
above, Zambian fishers, chiefs and officials have shown how co-management 
can work sustainably – but because co-management normally focuses on high 
value, relatively localised resources, it is not a mode of commons governance that 
can be scaled up across the broad, lower value landscapes where better resource 
management is also urgently needed.
In a second scenario, despite CROSCOG’s ambitions, the cases revealed 
more problems than progress, and the lessons for broader application are negative 
rather than positive. This is certainly the case in the Kariba area of Zimbabwe 
described by Mhlanga (2009). One would not wish the fragmentation and 
dysfunctional institutional overlaps afflicting that area to be spread more broadly 
(see also Hughes 2010). Nevertheless, such scenarios can point the way forward 
if feasible means to redress the weaknesses can be identified. How practicable it 
is to reintegrate state resource management institutions with each other and with 
indigenous structures we must leave it to the reader to judge. An unanswered 
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question, but again a possible potential, lies in a stronger and more equitable role 
for local government structures.
The third scenario is clearest in Botswana, although it exists in Lesotho too and 
arguably in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Here, the scaling up has already happened. 
Across the whole country, or at least across all its communal areas, local government 
institutions are in place with a clear land and natural resource management mandate. 
There are three challenges in such cases. The first is to redress the evident weaknesses 
of commons governance by local government where such arrangements have been 
in place for some time. This is the case in Zimbabwe and Botswana. The second is to 
build new local government structures into effective agents of commons governance 
– as in Lesotho and Mozambique. The third challenge cuts across both the other 
scenarios. It is to make local government more local. District Councils, Community 
Councils and similar structures typically administer large areas comprising many 
communities and landscapes. Effective governance of the commons requires more 
localised structures to interact with formal local government bodies. One such 
arrangement is when user groups develop and enforce by-laws with and on behalf 
of a local government council. In other variants of this co-management by ‘local 
government’ and truly local structures, traditional leaders or village councils could 
do the day-to-day governance of the commons.
CROSCOG researchers’ review of the state of Southern African commons 
governance identifies cases of all three of these scenarios. The programme’s 
papers presented in this special feature and elsewhere, also describe a number of 
key trends and themes that are relevant across the region. Not surprisingly, they 
repeatedly identify the degradation of the natural resources comprising these 
commons, and of the institutions that are supposed to govern them. They report 
the pressures of (typically extra-legal) privatisation that many communal areas 
face. The clear conclusion is that communal tenure arrangements and institutions 
need to be reinforced in a number of Southern African states, although current 
attempts to do this in South Africa and Lesotho have proved confused and 
ineffective so far.
Two other broad trends which are neither the focus of this paper nor the 
CROSCOG project in general are worthy to be mentioned as they help to frame 
all the challenges of commons governance in Southern Africa. One is the shifting 
livelihood roles that the commons play. Migrant labour from the communal 
areas has been a reality for a century across most of the region, constraining and 
reshaping the roles of common pool resources in the livelihoods of the rural poor. 
More recent economic, demographic and social trends in many areas have further 
reduced dependence on the commons, or introduced new commercial market 
incentives for unsustainably heavy use of some commons resources. Typical 
results include a decreasing dependence on the commons for substantial numbers 
of communal area residents; more specialised use of some commons resources 
by sub-sectors of the rural (and urban) population; and increased dependence 
on dwindling or degrading resources for the poorest people – especially female-
headed households (Matose 2009).
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Another broad trend, concerns the ‘degradation’ of local governance and 
attempts to redress it. Although they have proved the most durable of local 
government institutions, traditional leaders are now often unable, for various 
reasons, to be as effective in commons management as they used to be. Many of 
the local government structures introduced by colonial regimes and independent 
states have foundered in poverty, incapacity and corruption (Magole 2003, 
2009; Haller and Chabwela 2009; Matose 2009). Whatever legislation may say, 
they are no longer effective or equitable in the governance of the commons or 
anything else. Nevertheless, as argued above, the most promising way forward 
for promoting effective governance of the commons at scale in Southern 
Africa is to link the truly local scale of resource users and managers into the 
legal authority and possibly stronger capacity of reformed local governance 
institutions.
Any such approach implies a stronger differentiation between the ‘state’, 
which much analysis assumes to mean central government and its field agencies, 
and local government and their links with other governance structures. Some 
Southern African constitutions, notably that of South Africa, make it crystal 
clear that there are different, coequal spheres of government, and set out the 
respective roles and powers of the central and the local spheres. Yet, even in 
South Africa, the governance roles between government and other players are 
often not clear.
Elsewhere, the distinction between these two forms of government is not 
so clear in either general administrative practice or in planning and analysis for 
enhanced commons governance. The current dysfunctional situation, common in 
many parts of the region but most clearly described from Zambia by Chabwela and 
Haller (this special feature), is that the state is both present and absent. It is present 
in its ideological claims of resource ownership and management authority, but is 
largely absent in terms of effective, competent resource management – although 
its police and game scouts show up just often enough to frustrate, destabilise 
and impoverish resource users with their levies, sanctions and penalties. These 
weaknesses of the state mean that, although there certainly are cases of successful 
co-management to report, that mode of commons governance must be approached 
with caution – even in those limited, localised, high resource value settings 
referred to above.
6. Conclusion
The CROSCOG programme was not entirely successful in identifying strategies to 
build from successful local experience of commons governance across ecosystems 
and at broader scales. Nevertheless, some basic building blocks for more effective 
commons governance can be identified from the cases described in the papers 
below. The first two building blocks have ancient roots. Indigenous environmental 
knowledge still has an important role to play, but outsiders should avoid any 
romantic assumptions about how widespread or accurate it is in rapidly changing 
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21st century livelihoods. Indigenous resource governance systems, as CROSCOG 
has emphasised since its launch, are often still the only resource governance 
happening at all – however fragmented or imperfect they may now be.
A third kind of building block for any effective modern governance of the 
Southern African commons is economic interest. Once again, particularly in 
a neoliberal context, the nature of that interest is increasingly diverse as rural 
livelihoods lose their earlier uniformity and fragment into multiple socio-
economic sub-sectors and strategies. Whatever the nature of that evolving 
livelihood diversity, however, it is clear that commons governance strategies 
must provide equitably balanced incentives to what should be the full range of 
economic interests represented in rural resource-using society. The fourth and 
fifth kinds of building blocks for commons governance have been discussed 
above. They are local government institutions and central government institutions: 
district councils, for example, with their legislative authority and representative 
mandate, and central state structures like departments of fisheries, forestry 
and wildlife. The challenge, of course, is to assemble these last two kinds of 
building blocks into a structure that will stand and function in the long-term at an 
affordable cost to society.
7. Ways forward for scholarship of the Southern African 
commons
The CROSCOG programme was a limited, two years effort. Its ambitions were 
modest, but the resulting papers (published here and elsewhere) suggest that it 
has had at least some success in achieving the intended integration of scholarship 
and useable findings from work across ecosystems that emphasised the promotion 
of effective commons governance at larger scales. Readers reviewing the 
programme’s outputs are invited to consider what signposts it suggests towards 
further work by scholars of the Southern African commons. From programme 
participants’ perspective, the following suggestions can be made.
As we believe CROSCOG has shown, researchers can add value to their work 
by thinking – if not working – at broader scales. In the social science of developing 
countries, there has been a tradition of focusing on case study or local areas and 
seeking to understand and explain it in detail. Laudable as this is from many points 
of view; the urgent need now is for researchers to integrate their understanding and 
explanations across ecosystems and, to the extent that their data support it, across 
larger areas (see also Ferguson 2006). The student of wetlands management and 
the researcher of range management, for example, should share their insights and 
challenges more thoroughly. In assessing a particular community, forest or nature 
reserve, scholars should make maximum effort to extrapolate, to seek similarities 
and variance with comparable and different communal areas in their own countries 
and elsewhere in the region.
It is for the reader to judge from the following papers how successfully the 
CROSCOG team worked to this end. In any event, it should be clear that this 
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programme has striven to deliver applied social science that can make a practical 
difference to the challenges of poverty and resource degradation that are so 
widespread on the Southern African commons. This introduction has emphasised 
that applying social science is not necessarily simple. The old assumption that 
research would feed policy and that policy would make the desired difference 
is no longer valid (if it ever was). In seeking to make a practical contribution, 
scholars must understand policy processes and how effective they really are, 
and not be afraid to speak out of the box, to challenge ‘received wisdoms’ and 
approach matters in ways that are perhaps less common to the ‘policy world’.
Researchers can take a further step. They can engage themselves more 
actively (without necessarily calling themselves ‘action researchers’) in the work 
of enhancing commons governance, through regular direct interaction with key 
stakeholders. This may involve periodic reports to government departments 
or community forums, membership of supervisory or advisory structures like 
steering committees, boards or reference groups, or service as resource persons to 
agencies or groups that are seeking to reform natural resource management. Any 
such step implies medium to long-term involvement with the cases or institutions 
under study. The well-known academic value of longitudinal studies in this sort 
of social science can thus be matched by enhanced practical value. Many of the 
commons scholars whose work is described in the following papers certainly hope 
to be able to continue their research and their contributions in these ways.
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